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Abstract
Charities often devise fund-raising strategies that exploit natural human compet-
itiveness in combination with the desire for public recognition. We explore whether
institutions promoting competition can aﬀect altruistic giving - even when possibili-
ties for public acclaim are minimal. In a controlled laboratory experiment based on
a sequential “dictator game”, we find that subjects tend to give more when placed
in a generosity tournament, and tend to give less when placed in an earnings tour-
nament - even if there is no award whatsoever for winning the tournament. Further
we find that subjects’ experimental behavior correlates with their responses to a post-
experiment questionnaire, particularly questions addressing altruistic and rivalrous be-
havior. Based on this evidence, we argue that behavior in our experiment is driven, in
part, by innate competitive motives.
JEL classification numbers: C91, D64, D80
Keywords: Dictator game, charitable giving, competitive altruism, relative stand-
ing, tournaments, factor analysis.
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“I talked to both Bill Gates and Warren Buﬀett, the two richest men in the
country, and they would be inclined to give more if there was a list of who did
the giving rather than the having.” Ted Turner (as quoted by Dowd 1996)
1 Introduction
Media mogul Ted Turner suggested that natural human competitiveness might be exploited
to stimulate charitable giving, by publishing a rank list of the largest U.S. givers. As Dowd
(1996) described Turner’s idea, “Why not start an annual list of the most generous, oﬀering
an “Ebenezer Scrooge Prize” that embarrasses stingy billionaires and a “Heart of Gold
Award”to honor philanthropists?”If winning a generosity tournament confers some rank or
social status, competitive altruism might counteract competitive selfishness. This suggestion
prompted the creation of Slate magazine’s rankings of the most generous Americans, as an
antithesis to Forbes magazine’s list of the wealthiest Americans.
Does competition aﬀect charitable giving? Many charities seem to think so. As Glazer
and Konrad (1996) observe, charities frequently publish the names of contributors providing
various threshold amounts of giving in clearly defined, rank-ordered categories with labels
such as “contributor”, “benefactor”and so on (in lieu of reporting the actual amounts given).
They develop a model in which individuals can signal their unobservable income via the level
of their giving. Similarly, Harbaugh (1998) uses empirical data on charitable contributions
grouped by threshold categories to estimate a utility function that can diﬀerentiate between
intrinsic motivations and extrinsic concerns for “prestige,”and reports that both factors play
a role in the amounts given. While winning a competition can certainly result in public
acclaim, prestige and other extrinsic rewards, we argue in this paper that giving behavior
may be aﬀected by much weaker, intrinsic competitive motives, e.g., with regard to one’s
standing relative to others, and that such competitive urges will be operative even when
possibilities for public acclaim or other extrinsic rewards are absent.1
We report on a controlled laboratory experiment aimed at understanding whether the
purely intrinsic motive of competition, here with regard to relative standing, can be mech-
anistically exploited to aﬀect giving behavior.2 Our experiment involves three diﬀerent
1Frey and Osterloh (2002, p.8) suggest that extrinsic motivation "serves to satisfy indirect or instrumental
needs" while intrinsic motivation "satisfies a direct need in its own right." They suggest that money or
peer group recognition are examples of extrinsic motivations while satisfaction with a job well done or the
achievement of personal goals are examples of intrinsic motivations.
2As List (2007, p.492) pointed out, “simple dictator games . . . can elicit diﬀerent behaviors towards
others and shed light on how institutions aﬀect behavior in subtle ways”. By contrast with field or survey
data, laboratory research aﬀords the greatest control in assessing causal relationships. For instance, in the
laboratory we can assess whether a single factor, e.g., information on the charitable contributions of others,
as opposed to other, potentially confounding factors, e.g., the tax-treatment of certain charitable gifts, aﬀects
the amount of charitable contributions.
1
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treatments of a dictator contest. This contest is a sequential version of a “dictator game”
in which individuals are anonymously paired and one member of each pair — “the dictator”—
unilaterally determines how to allocate a given endowment ($10 per decision round) between
himself and his unique “match.” At the end of each round, all dictators are publicly ranked
(without disclosing the identities of players) according to a particular experimental “frame”
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Andreoni 1995a) corresponding to one of our treatment
conditions. In our “Altruistic treatment”, dictators are ranked in descending order according
to the amount they give away, while in our “Selfish”treatment they are ranked in descending
order according to the amount they keep for themselves. In a third “Control” treatment,
ranks are known to be awarded spuriously. Ranking was done without disclosing the actual
amounts that were given and kept so as to minimize the possibility of conformism or other
norm-driven behavior. In all three treatments, subjects were specifically instructed that their
earnings were unaﬀected by their rank.
We explore whether these seemingly minor interventions can have measurable eﬀects on
subjects’ giving behavior. We report three main findings. First, and most importantly,
socially relevant information on relative standing interacts with innate competitive urges to
yield significant diﬀerences in giving behavior, even in anonymous settings lacking in public
acclaim or other extrinsic rewards. On average, subjects in our Selfish treatment give away
the least, while those in our Altruistic treatment give away the most; amounts given away
by subjects in the Control treatment lie in between. Remarkably, subjects in our Selfish
treatment give an average of just 7.4 percent of the pie, which is, to our knowledge, the
lowest recorded average giving in dictator games with a positive domain of oﬀers - c.f.,
Camerer (2003, Table 2.4 on pp. 57-58), even lower than the double-blind design of Hoﬀman
et al. (1994).3
Second, our findings are not easily attributed to “experimenter demand eﬀects,” i.e., the
desire by subjects to behave in a way they believe the experimenter wishes them to behave
(see, e.g., Zizzo in press). While demand eﬀects may be unavoidable given our design, we do
not find, for instance, that subjects in the Selfish treatment start out giving the least or that
subjects in the Altruistic treatment compete so as to increase their giving over time as one
would expect under a “demand eﬀects explanation” of our findings. Rather, we find that
giving behavior is more complex and appears to depend both on group dynamics as well as
on individual motives.
Finally, we observe that there is considerable heterogeneity in subject behavior, especially
when socially relevant information is provided. We find that some subjects never change
their allocations over the course of a session, that is, they are “resolute” in their giving
decisions, and there are more of these “resolute” types in the Control treatment, where
socially relevant information is absent. When giving was not encouraged (in the Selfish and
3List (2007, p.484) suggested that some experimental setups may provide “the dictator with the “moral
authority” to give nothing”. Indeed this eﬀect may further augment the competitive pressures of the Selfish
treatment, contributing to the extremely self-regarding behavior found here.
2
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Control treatments), most resolute-type subjects kept everything though when giving was
encouraged, as in the Altruistic treatment, resolute-type subjects were equally split between
those who kept everything and those who gave away half. Among non-resolute types, we
find evidence that these subjects respond to the social information provided in the Selfish
and Altruistic treatments. We observe the greatest overall variance in giving behavior in
the Altruistic treatment and the lowest overall variance in giving behavior in the Selfish
treatment.
In summary, our content-free Control treatment yields a strong and consistently dis-
couraging eﬀect on giving. The social incentives imbedded in the content-loaded Selfish
and Altruistic treatments yield more complex dynamics for giving behavior. Over time,
the Selfish treatment discourages giving even more intensely than the Control treatment.
In contrast, the social incentives of the Altruistic treatment initially have a comparative
encouraging eﬀect on giving, yet this eﬀect is found to erode over time as subjects gain
experience with the environment.
To explore the interplay between subjects’ motives and their behavior in the experiment
we asked subjects to complete a post-experiment questionnaire. We designed this ques-
tionnaire to address several distinct possible motives for subject behavior: altruism, rivalry,
conformism, money-seeking, variety-seeking and a desire to please others (experimenter de-
mand). We found that only two of these motives — “Altruism” and “Rivalry” — could be
reliably evaluated using our questionnaire. We further found that the scores on questions
addressing these two motives are highly correlated. To better capture the complex inter-
dependencies between these altruism and rivalry motives and to create orthogonal factors
suitable for a subsequent regression analysis, we conducted a principal factor analysis. This
analysis revealed that there are two latent factors underlying subjects’ altruism and rivalry
motives. The primary factor can be interpreted as subjects’ disposition towards rivalry and
against altruism, while the secondary factor can be interpreted as subjects’ disposition to-
wards both rivalry and altruism. Consistent with our competitive hypothesis, the primary
factor was significant in explaining behavior in the Selfish treatment for all variables of
interest, and never significant in the Altruistic treatment, while the secondary factor was
significant in explaining behavior in the Altruistic treatment, particularly as a determinant of
a subject’s lack of disposition to give zero in all ten rounds, as well as a subject’s disposition
towards competition in giving. In other words, while other motives (such as experimenter
demand, social acceptability, boredom, etc.) may have played a role in subjects’ behavior in
our experiment, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that our subjects’ behavior is driven, at
least in part, by innate competitive motives.
3
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2 Related Literature
Economists have accumulated strong empirical evidence that economic performance is en-
hanced by competitive motives (see, e.g., Weiss and Fershtman 1998) and, moreover that
higher rank in the “pecking order” leads to greater well-being (see, e.g., Brown et al. 2008).
While most economic contests have been designed so that interpersonal competition further
promotes self-regarding behavior, there have been few attempts to use tournament-like en-
vironments to alter other-regarding behavior. Andreoni (1995b) reports that, in a public
goods experiment, giving information on an individual’s rank in earnings or paying subjects
according to this rank induces less cooperative behavior relative to the standard experimen-
tal design where information on relative earnings is not provided. Bolton (1991) reports
that in an alternating-oﬀer bargaining game, paying subjects according to their relative
performance in a group promotes self-regarding behavior. With the exception of Barclay
(2004), who shows that competitive altruism may help to maintain cooperative behavior in
public goods games, most of the studies that employ tournament-like elements explore how
monetary (extrinsic) incentives may weaken or enhance non-monetary (intrinsic) motives.
As recent research suggests, the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is
complex; extrinsic motivations may encourage or frustrate intrinsic motivations. Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000) report that when extrinsic, (i.e., monetary) incentives are “too small”they
may hinder intrinsic motivations, but when “large enough” extrinsic motivations may have
the opposite eﬀect, following the general pattern of a “W”(see more on this in Gneezy
2003). Bénabou and Tirole (2003) further identify circumstances where explicit incentives
may reinforce or weaken intrinsic motivations. Here we explore the opposite possibility that
non-monetary, competitive motives may weaken or enhance monetary motives.
Experimental studies by Ball et al. (2001), Kumru and Vesterlund (2008) and Dufwen-
berg and Muren (2006) have studied giving behavior in non-anonymous settings, where
giving may be closely tied up with such extrinsic, instrumental factors as status, social ac-
claim or individuals’ perception of the social situation, as opposed to being governed by the
more subtle intrinsic influences we focus on in our anonymous giving design. By disclosing
subjects’ identities and utilizing “strong” experimenter demand eﬀects, these studies looked
at strong, instrumental-type concerns. We, instead, are interested in whether individuals
make choices that allow them to stand “higher” than the rest, under weaker (if any) ex-
perimenter demand eﬀects. If subjects’ giving is malleable, even by the weak competitive
incentives of our design, the eﬀect seems likely to be more pronounced in non-anonymous
environments where payoﬀs are further enhanced by social acclaim and prestige, e.g., among
the “Ted Turner crowd”of large donors.
Competitive mechanisms such as winner-pay and all-pay auctions and lotteries have been
found to be successful in counteracting free-riding in public goods games, particularly for
charity auctions - both in the laboratory and the field - see Carpenter et al. (2008), Corazzini
4
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et al. (in press), Duﬀy and Matros (2009), Orzen (2008), and Schram and Onderstal (2009).
In contrast to the design employed here, these mechanisms typically involve an explicit prize
to the winner, thus providing strong, extrinsic incentives to compete.
Subjects may seek information for a variety of reasons. Samuelson (2004) argues that
Nature may have built relative concerns into individual preferences for the purpose of
information-gathering: the decisions of compatriots provides valuable information about
the state of the environment and it may be optimal to use such information in making one’s
own decisions. Thus, behavior might be driven by information-gathering motives in the
spirit of Samuelson (2004), rather than the competitive motives stressed by Veblen (1899)
and Frank (1985a). Cason and Mui (1998) consider the possibility that subjects extract
information about what level of giving is socially acceptable in dictator experiments; they
provide subjects with one such observation. Duﬀy and Feltovich (1999) do the same in ul-
timatum game experiments. Krupka and Weber (2009) find that subjects generally behave
more pro-socially when they observe more pro-social behavior on the part of others. In the
context of public goods provision problem, Vesterlund (2003) explored the possibility that
the prior contributions of others may provide a signal about the quality of a public good.
Eckel and Wilson (2006) examined social learning when individuals, whose decisions were
observed by others, diﬀered in social status. Croson (2007) explored the possibility that sub-
jects might condition their contributions on the lowest, middle, or highest contribution, and
thus might seek information diﬀerentially depending on their conditional strategy. Kurzban
and DeScioli (2008) further explore such information-seeking behavior in public goods games
and report that subjects systematically diﬀer in the information they solicit, with “recipro-
cators” typically interested in information about the median contribution while “free-riders”
are more interested in information about the highest contribution. Frey and Meier (2004),
Shang and Croson (2009) and Chen et al. (in press) show that providing socially relevant
information - for example, about other people’s contributions, has a sizeable eﬀect in field
experiments. Interestingly, as Andreoni and Petrie (2004) find, disclosing the entire distrib-
ution of contributions within each group does not change the overall levels of contributions
relative to the standard treatment. While statistics representing central tendencies (such
as mean or median) are payoﬀ-relevant in public good games, in contrast, Oﬀerman and
Schotter (2009) find that in single-person decision problems subjects tend to sample from
the decisions of either the best-performing or the worst-performing individuals, and rarely
from average-performing individuals.
A number of studies suggest that subjects’ giving in dictator games may be particularly
sensitive to the interplay of the experimental setup and moral considerations. Rigdon et al.
(2008) find that even subtle cues suggesting that individuals may be observed can have a
sizeable eﬀect on subjects’ choices in dictator games leading to more other-regarding behav-
ior. Bardsley (2008) finds that dictators’ choices become significantly more selfish when it is
possible to take money away from the recipient. This was also explored by List (2007), who
suggests that whenever the experimental setup provides the dictator with a moral authority
to give nothing, other-regarding behavior reduces dramatically. Lazear et al. (2009) find
5
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that when subjects can opt out of a dictator game, those who remain tend to make more
self-regarding choices.
Several recent studies have also sought to identify subjects’ motivations from their exper-
imental actions (e.g. Houser et al. (2004), Kurzban and Houser (2005), Bardsley and Moﬀat
(2005), Ashley et al. (in press) in public good games, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) in the
centipede game). To our knowledge, attempts to infer the motivations behind giving in dicta-
tor experiments have been scarce. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2009) find that subjects’ responses
to information about other dictators’ giving varies systematically across their identified so-
cial preference types; social information has little eﬀect on “selfish” types and tends to aﬀect
those with interdependent preferences in the direction of fostering more selfish choices.
Most theoretical models that allow agents to have relative concerns either assume that
individuals are informed about the levels of other players’ payoﬀs — either on an individual
level (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or on an aggregate level (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), — or
involve only two agents (Charness and Rabin 2002). In our experiment, we have more than
two subjects and none are aware of the levels of others’ payoﬀs. Thus, to our knowledge,
neither existing models nor existing methodologies are suitable for the issues we seek to
address with our design.
3 Experimental Design
We employ a novel experimental design, which we refer to as a dictator contest. Our dictator
contest is a combination of the one-shot dictator game design of Forsythe et al. (1994), the
sequential dictator game design of Cason and Mui (1998) and the rank information design
of Andreoni (1995b).
In a one-shot dictator game, each subject is randomly and anonymously paired with
another subject. One member of each pair is designated as the “dictator,”the other is
designated as the “recipient,” and a fixed amount of money is provisionally allocated to each
pair. The dictator then unilaterally decides on (dictates) how the amount of money is to be
divided between him/herself and the recipient or “match”. The two players are then paid
according to the dictator’s allocation. If a dictator’s only goal is to maximize his earnings,
then he should keep all of the money for himself, allocating zero to his match. However, there
is now overwhelming evidence that many subjects give a substantial share of the money to
their match (see Camerer 2003). Various explanations for this finding have been oﬀered all
of them suggesting that subjects care not only about their monetary earnings but also about
behaving in a socially appropriate way (see Forsythe et al. 1994; Hoﬀman et al. 1994).
In Cason and Mui’s (1998) sequential dictator game design, subjects make two dictator
decisions and receive information about one other subject’s first-round dictator allocation
6
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before making their second-round allocation decision.4 In Andreoni’s (1995b) “RegRank”
treatment, subjects participating in a public goods game received information about their
relative rank in experimental earnings, though they were paid in the “regular” fashion, i.e.,
according to their individual earnings.5
In our dictator contest, subjects receive information about their relative standing with
respect to all other dictators (subjects) in the room (as in Andreoni (1995b), but in contrast
to Cason and Mui who provide information only about one other dictator’s allocation).
Specifically, in our dictator contest, dictators are informed of their rank, with first (i.e., top)
rank going to the player(s) who kept the most for themselves in the Selfish (S) treatment and
to the player(s) who gave away the most (kept the least for themselves) in the Altruistic (A)
treatment. In a third Control (C) treatment, players were informed that ranks were randomly
assigned; therefore such rank assignments conveyed no information about the behavior of
other players. To allow subjects to adapt to their social surroundings (i.e., the other subjects
in the room), and develop their strategies, dictator-subjects played 10 rounds of the dictator
contest with the same group of dictators.
Each of our experimental sessions involves 15 subjects who were randomly assigned to
one of the three treatments (5 subjects per treatment). The three treatments were conducted
simultaneously by three experimenters in three diﬀerent rooms. In each room, instructions
were handed out and then read aloud.6 Players were informed that they were matched with
another player in another room and that this player would be the recipient of their dictator
decision. The 5 dictators in each room were then asked to simultaneously and privately
allocate a fixed amount of money between themselves and their anonymous, fixed match for
10 rounds. While subjects were informed that they had a matched recipient in another room,
they were not informed (until the end of the experimental session) that they had also been
randomly and anonymously assigned to be the recipient of the decision made by another
dictator, and that in this “recipient role” they would also receive the amount allocated to
them by that dictator.7 Thus, each subject in a particular treatment (room) was matched
with two other subjects (one each from the other two rooms) - his recipient in one room, and
4In another treatment, Cason and Mui (1998) also provide subjects with socially irrelevant information,
and, contrary to their expectations, find that more subjects changed their allocation once presented with
irrelevant information, rather than after learning about another dictator’s choice.
5Andreoni (1995b) reports that contributions were lower in the RegRank treatment than in the “regular”
treatment where information on relative earnings was not given. Andreoni’s motivation for the RegRank
treatment was to reduce confusion among subjects in a public good game, as opposed to stimulation of
selfish, competitive urges.
6The interested reader can read/download the instructions used in all three treatments of the experiment
at: http://www.pitt.edu/˜jduﬀy/dictator/.
7We did not want subjects to think they should oﬀer more as dictators because they were simultaneously
serving in the recipient role. Given the complexity of our three-room matching design, providing such
information had the potential to create extra confusion and distraction. While using a real charity as the
recipient might eliminate reciprocal concerns, it could compromise our desire to maintain the anonymity of
subjects’s giving and possibly lead to some free-riding. Notice that, whatever consequences our design choices
may have had on subjects’ behavior, these consequences should be symmetric across the three treatments.
7
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his dictator in the other, but in making decisions was aware only of his match to a recipient
of his/her dictator allocation. In all transactions and postings of information, subjects were
identified by a private ID letter only.
Each of the 10 rounds of our dictator contest consists of three steps. In the first step,
subjects make decisions (on proposal forms) as to how they wish to divide the $10 that
has been provisionally allocated to them — they must specify dollar amounts (in one cent
increments) for themselves and their match that add up to $10. Next, the subjects’ folded
proposal forms were collected in a basket and the basket was shaken up so that it was
not possible to associate any subject with his/her proposal form. The experimenter then
privately reviewed and sorted the proposals according to the treatment-specific criterion.
Finally, the experimenter presents the ranked list of subjects’ letter IDs on a blackboard
according to the treatment-specific order; this ranking is observable to all subjects in the
room. Note that information on dollar amounts is not given; the information displayed
on the blackboard consisted of a rank-ordered display of subjects’ letter IDs only. While
subjects’ letter IDs remained constant over all rounds, these IDs were private information;
subjects were not identifiable to other subjects in the room or to the experimenter. Once
subjects had time to observe their rank and to record their rank on a record sheet, a new
round would begin. Rank information from previous rounds was left on the blackboard for
all to see. Subjects were specifically instructed that their rank did not aﬀect their payoﬀ in
any way and that in addition to a show-up fee, the money they allocated to themselves in
one of the 10 rounds, chosen at random at the end of the session, would be paid to them in
cash.
We chose to use anonymous rank orderings so as to avoid any experimenter-led social
acclaim (used in previous studies exploring social standing), thus minimizing the possibility
of confounding individual competitive motives with desires for status or social acclaim from
other subjects or from the experimenter.8 Notice further that, by informing subjects of their
rank, rather than of the individual dollar amounts kept or given by others, we minimize the
eﬀect that such information might have on the development of social norms of keeping or
giving.9 Finally, we note that in our dictator contest, each subject in the dictator role has
a unique matched partner to whom they may choose to allocate a part of their endowment.
This design carefully avoids free-riding eﬀects that might arise, e.g., if groups of players
(dictators) were deciding how much to give to a single charity; such free-riding eﬀects could
confound eﬀects generated by the social information (rank lists) we provide and we wanted
to avoid such diﬃculties.
8Indeed some studies have found that subjects give much more generously in public rather than in private
settings. See, e.g., Andreoni and Petrie (2004) or Rege and Telle (2004).
9The latter design feature is also consistent with the practice by charities of grouping contributions into
rank-ordered categories as noted above, perhaps for the same reason we give. We decided against using
“category reporting”in our design as it could aﬀect subjects’ allocation decisions by shifting contributions
toward the lower end of each category - see Harbaugh (1998) as well as Andreoni and Petrie (2004) - a
phenomenon we wanted to avoid.
8
Page 10 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
The treatment-specific procedures were as follows. In the Selfish (S) treatment, proposal
forms were collected and sorted by the experimenter in descending order of the amounts
subjects allocated to themselves. The letter ID of the person(s) who allocated the largest
amount to him/herself relative to the rest of the subjects in the group, was (were) assigned
1st rank, the next largest amount was (were) awarded second rank, etc. Letter IDs and ranks
were written on the blackboard for all to see. Conversely, in the Altruistic (A) treatment,
the proposal forms were sorted in descending order of the amounts subjects allocated to
their match. The letter ID of the person(s) who allocated the largest amount relative to the
rest of the subjects in the group was (were) assigned 1st rank, and so on. In the Control
(C) treatment, after the proposal forms were collected, ranks were assigned according to the
random order in which proposal forms were drawn from a basket by the experimenter.10 In
all three treatments, if ties occurred, rank places were skipped. For instance, if two players
tied for first rank, then there would be no second rank, and the next highest amount was
awarded third rank, etc. Appendix B11 provides a table with all our experimental data
including the rankings of letter IDs as presented to subjects in each round.
The procedures for rank assignment in the three treatments were carefully explained in
the instructions and can be regarded as public information. Subjects knew the meaning of
the rank information presented in the Selfish or Altruistic treatments and they also knew that
rank information in the Control treatment was spurious. Subjects knew their own letter ID,
but could not associate other letter IDs with the names or faces of any other individual in their
group, though they did know that letter IDs were constant over all rounds played. Finally,
subjects were specifically instructed that “your rank (place) in the list on the blackboard
does not determine your money payment,” so truly self-interested individuals should have
avoided conditioning on the rank information given.
Thus, each subject made their first decision in the absence of any socially relevant in-
formation. The subsequent nine decisions were made after all subjects learned how their
previous allocations stood relative to all 4 others in their group in the Selfish and Altruistic
treatments, or among the randomly assigned ranks of the Control treatment. Since the high-
est amount kept is the lowest amount given away, the potential diﬀerence (if any) between
the three treatments is entirely due to the competitive frame provided.
A total of 60 subjects participated in 4 sessions; no subject participated in more than 1
session. Each session consisted of 3 groups of 5 subjects each (one 5-member group for each
of the three treatments). The subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population
of the University of Pittsburgh and had no prior experience with this experimental design.
Subjects were guaranteed $10 just for participating in the one-hour experiment and were
10We chose to assign spurious ranks in the Control treatment (rather than making no rank assignments)
so as to minimize diﬀerences in the design of this treatment relative to the Altruistic and Selfish treatments.
In the Control treatment, if the experimenter picked up two proposal forms at once (a rare event), a tie rank
was declared for those two subjects (letter IDs).
11All appendices are found in the online supplemental materials.
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told that they “may earn an additional amount of money.”12 Subjects learned that they
were the recipient of another dictator’s decisions only following the last round of a session,
and no subject was ever identified by name. Following the completion of the 10th round of
the dictator contest, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire. The list of questions
asked and the means and standard deviations of subjects’ responses are found in Appendix
C. This questionnaire was designed to assess individual subject motives so that we might
better understand subjects’ giving behavior in our experiment. Subjects were not informed
of this questionnaire in advance of its administration at the end of the session. They were
oﬀered $5 if they provided answers to all 24 questions, and all subjects agreed to do so.
Thus, subjects’ earnings for this 1-hour experiment were the sum of four numbers: the
$10 participation payment, the amount they chose to allocate to themselves (out of $10) in
the one randomly chosen round, the amount they received from another dictator (in another
room) in one randomly chosen round, and finally $5 for completing the questionnaire.
4 Experimental Results
Ourmain experimental hypothesis is that the incentives provided by competitive, tournament-
like institutions reinforce subjects’ intrinsic competitive motives aﬀecting their giving deci-
sions in a predictable manner. According to this hypothesis, overall giving should be highest
in the Altruistic treatment, lowest in the Selfish treatment, and in-between in the Control
treatment. Appendix A provides a theoretical foundation for this competitive hypothesis.
The raw data on amounts given by each subject in each round of all our experimental
sessions including the ranking information that was presented to the subjects is shown in the
Table in Appendix B.13 In the following sections we provide an analysis of how well that data
conform to our experimental hypothesis and we also attempt to account for heterogeneity in
subject behavior.
12The $10 participation payment was intended to provide subjects with suﬃcient compensation for their
time spent in the experiment (one-hour). We were careful to avoid suggesting how much subjects could earn
in addition to the participation payment to avoid creation of norms regarding socially acceptable amounts
of giving.
13The table in Appendix B also indicates the gender of each subject. While there were 9 males and 11
females in the Selfish treatment, 11 males and 9 females in the Altruistic, and 12 males and 8 females in the
Control, the diﬀerences in gender allocations across treatments are not significant (χ2 = 0.9375, p = 0.7). We
further conducted 2-sided t-tests of whether there were any significant diﬀerences in round 1 giving amounts
between males and females in each of our three treatments. We also looked for gender diﬀerences in average
giving over rounds 2-10 of all three treatments when social information was present. We found no significant
diﬀerences between male and female giving in any of these tests (p > .10 in all cases). We therefore do not
address gender as a factor in our analysis of the experimental data.
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4.1 Aggregate Behavior
As Table 1 reveals, in line with the predictions of the competitive hypothesis, the mean
amount given away is highest in the Altruistic treatment, lowest in the Selfish treatment,
and in-between in the Control treatment.
All Subjects N.Obs. Selfish (S) Altruistic (A) Control (C)
Total Giving: Mean (st.dev.) 200 $0.74 (1.49) $2.59 (2.60) $1.37 (1.99)
Round 1 Giving: Mean (st.dev.) 20 $1.77 (1.99) $3.00 (2.64) $1.25 (1.97)
Rounds 2-10 Giving: Mean (st.dev.) 180 $0.62 (1.39) $2.54 (2.60) $1.38 (1.99)
Table 1: Aggregate descriptive statistics for giving in the three treatments.
Observe further that, in all three treatments, the frequency distributions (Figure 1, left
panel) exhibit a pronounced mode at zero giving, consistent with other dictator game find-
ings. The Selfish treatment exhibits the highest frequency of zero oﬀers (64 percent), followed
by the Control treatment (63.5 percent), with the lowest frequency in the Altruistic treat-
ment (36.5 percent). A second mode is observed around $5 with the highest frequency of
such “equal split” oﬀers in the Altruistic treatment (24.5 percent), followed by the Control
treatment (17.5 percent), and with the lowest frequency in the Selfish treatment (8.5 per-
cent). Furthermore, only the Altruistic treatment exhibits any oﬀers above $5 (9.5 percent),
with giving of $10 (the whole “pie”) amounting to 3 percent of all oﬀers.
< Figure 1 appears about here >
Consistent with the competitive hypothesis, giving in the Altruistic treatment first-order
dominates giving in the other two treatments, while giving in the Selfish treatment is first-
order dominated by the other two treatments (see Figure 1, right panel). Furthermore, as our
first Finding summarizes, overall giving in the Selfish treatment is significantly lower than in
both the Altruistic and Control treatments (nonparametric, robust rank order test statistics
using the four session-level means for each pair of treatments are Ù4,4 = ∞, p = 0.01 and
Ù4,4 = 4.483, p = 0.025, respectively), while mean giving in the Altruistic treatment is
marginally greater than in the Control treatment (Ù4,4 = 1.586, p = 0.10).
Finding 1 In line with the competitive hypothesis, the Altruistic treatment yields the highest
overall giving, followed next by the Control treatment, which is in turn followed by the Selfish
treatment, where we observe the lowest overall giving.
While aggregate behavior is consistent with the competitive hypothesis, it is also possible
that subjects’ behavior might be due to “demand eﬀects”, i.e., a desire to please the exper-
imenter (see, e.g., Zizzo in press). If a demand eﬀect was indeed the driving force behind
11
Page 13 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
subjects’ behavior, it should be particularly strong in the very first decision round, before
ranking information is revealed, with mean first-round giving being highest in the Altruis-
tic treatment, lowest in the Selfish treatment, and intermediate in the Control treatment.
However, the evidence for such a prediction is mixed. As Table 1 shows, initial giving in
the Altruistic treatment is significantly higher than in the Selfish treatment (Ù4,4 = 4.483,
p = 0.025), but at the same time initial giving in the Control treatment is (marginally) sig-
nificantly lower than in the Selfish treatment and is significantly lower than in the Altruistic
treatment (Ù4,4 = 1.586, p = 0.10 and Ù4,4 = 8.090, p = 0.025, respectively).
Finding 2 Initial giving is lowest in the Control treatment, slightly higher in the Selfish
treatment and highest in the Altruistic treatment.
< Figure 2 appears about here >
One might further expect that, if a desire to please the experimenter remained operative
over the course of the session, then, over time, giving would decrease in the Selfish treatment
and increase in the Altruistic treatment. In fact, as Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, the dy-
namics of subjects’ giving behavior is more complex. In the early stages of the game (rounds
two through four), the Altruistic frame does weakly increase giving, though this increase,
relative to round one giving levels, is insignificant (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, p=0.3125). By
contrast, for the same block of three rounds, the Selfish frame exerts a strong influence,
with giving dropping more than 50% relative to initial, round 1 giving. Surprisingly, as
the game progresses into the fifth through seventh rounds, subjects in both the Selfish and
Altruistic treatments significantly decrease their giving relative to the previous three rounds
(p=0.0420 for the Selfish treatment and p=0.0471 for the Altruistic treatment). In the last
three rounds, giving further significantly declines in the Altruistic treatment (p=0.0757 rel-
ative to the previous three periods), while it insignificantly increases in the Selfish treatment
(p=0.4727). Giving in the Control treatment exhibits insignificant volatility (p>0.20 for all
pairwise comparisons between blocks of three rounds).
Comparing overall giving in rounds two through ten, when social information is present,
with round one giving, when social information is absent, reveals that giving significantly de-
creases in the Selfish treatment (p=0.0625), and also declines (albeit insignificantly, p=0.1875)
in the Altruistic treatment. By contrast, in the Control treatment, there is an insignificant
increase in giving in rounds two through ten relative to round one (p=0.5625). The decline in
giving in the two treatments with social information is even more pronounced if we compare
giving in round 1 with giving in the final three rounds (eight through ten). Giving in the last
three rounds is significantly lower in both the Selfish and Altruistic treatments (p=0.0093
and p=0.0839, respectively), and is insignificantly higher in the Control (p=0.4063). Thus,
while the potential for experimenter demand eﬀects cannot be avoided by our research design,
it does not appear to play a predictable role in the actual dynamics of subjects’ behavior.
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< Figure 3 appears about here >
Instead, our findings suggest that the main eﬀect of providing socially relevant informa-
tion in both the Selfish and Altruistic treatments is to depress giving. Indeed as Figure 3
makes clear, it appears that “learning to give less” relies upon the social information provided
in the Altruistic and Selfish treatments and not so much on “second thought,” introspective
reasoning, as there is no decrease in average giving in the Control treatment.14 Mean giving
in the Selfish frame declines dramatically, “overshooting” the low giving in the content-free
Control treatment, and resulting in, perhaps, the lowest recorded average giving in dictator
games with a restricted choice set.
While the severe decline in giving in the Selfish treatment is consistent with subjects
responding to the competitive frame (giving less in order to be ranked higher), the erosion
of giving in the Altruistic treatment is not. We can think of two explanation for the erosion
in giving in the Altruistic frame. One is that some subjects are using the rank information
to learn what constitutes an acceptable norm of giving; while the rank information does not
convey information about amounts given, subjects can make inferences about these amounts
by experimenting with the amounts they give themselves and observe how their rank changes.
Such subjects might be tempted to reduce their giving if they perceive that they are giving
more than the socially acceptable amount. Second, we note that the price of competing
in the Altruistic frame is considerably greater than in the Selfish frame, where competing
goes hand in hand with increasing one’s own payoﬀ. The higher price of competing in the
Altruistic frame may lead some subjects to drop out of the competition or to compete only
sporadically. Notice that both of these explanations have the same empirical implication,
namely that we should see more heterogeneity and hence greater variance in giving over time
in the Altruistic treatment as compared with the Selfish or Control treatments.
Indeed as Figure 2 demonstrates, giving in the Altruistic treatment exhibits the greatest
volatility and a much more slight downward trend relative to the Selfish treatment. Next,
compare the standard deviations in giving in rounds 2-10 (when subjects could observe rank
information) with initial first-round giving amounts (where ranking information is absent) in
Table 1. Rank information has almost no eﬀect on subject behavior in the Control treatment,
where the standard deviation in round 1 giving is about the same as for giving in rounds
2-10. By contrast, in the content-loaded treatments, rank information had a diﬀerential
eﬀect, leading to more homogeneous behavior in the Selfish treatment, where the standard
deviation in giving declined relative to the first-round value. By contrast, the standard
deviation in giving in rounds 2-10 of the Altruistic treatment remains at the same high level
that is observed for round 1 giving — the highest standard deviation in giving amounts across
the three treatments.
14See Weber and Rick (in press) for an experiment where subjects may learn in the absence of feedback.
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Finding 3 Over time, giving is most volatile in the Altruistic treatment and least volatile in
the Selfish treatment. Giving amounts decrease over time in both the Selfish and Altruistic
treatments, with the Selfish treatment generating the most significant decline. Giving amounts
do not change much in the Control treatment.
The next section addresses heterogeneity in subject behavior in more detail.
4.2 Subject Heterogeneity
We first report that, as in Cason and Mui (1998), some subjects never changed their alloca-
tion decision from the one they made in the very first round. These subjects made the same
allocation in all 10 rounds, and we label them as Resolute subjects. Details on the allocation
decisions of these Resolute subjects are provided in Table 2. We observe that there were
9 (45 percent) Resolute subjects in the Selfish treatment, 7 (35 percent) in the Altruistic,
and 14 (70 percent) in the Control.15 In other words, when social context is present (as in
the Selfish and the Altruistic treatments), there is a more extensive adjustment process in
giving decisions; this same process is strikingly absent when social context is absent (as in
the Control treatment). In each of the three treatments, there were many subjects who gave
away nothing in all 10 rounds and there were a few who chose an equal ($5) split. Finally,
we observe that average giving amounts among subjects classified as Resolute, remains con-
sistent with our competitive hypothesis: average giving by Resolute Subjects is greatest in
the Altruistic treatment lower in the Control treatment and lowest in the Selfish treatment.
No. of Resolute Subjects Selfish (SN) Altruistic (AN) Control (CN) All Treatments
Giving $0 8 4 11 23
Giving $3 1 1
Giving $4.99 1 1
Giving $5 1 3 1 5
Totals 9 7 14 30
Average Giving $0.55 $2.14 $0.93
Table 2: Giving by Resolute subjects (those who gave the same amount in each of the ten
rounds) by treatment.
Finding 4 More subjects never change their allocations (are “Resolute”) when socially rele-
vant information is absent (in the Control treatment) than when such information is present
15Compare this to Cason and Mui (1998) who found that, 9 out of 20 subjects never changed their decisions
in the control treatment, but only 16 out of 40 subjects changed their decision when social information was
present.
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(in the Selfish and the Altruistic treatments). Moreover, when giving was not encouraged by
the experimental design (in the Selfish and Control treatments), most Resolute subjects kept
everything, while when giving was encouraged (in the Altruistic treatment), Resolute subjects
were about equally split between those who gave away half of their endowment, and those who
kept everything.
In contrast, we label those subjects who changed their allocation decision at least once
over the 10 rounds as Non-Resolute subjects, and we present the descriptive statistics of
their giving in Table 3. In the Selfish and Control treatments, Non-Resolute subjects gave,
on average, significantly more than Resolute subjects (robust rank order test Ù11,9 = 3.55,
p = 0.00023 and Ù6,14 = 2.95, p = 0.0016, respectively), while there is no significant diﬀerence
between aggregate allocations made by the two types (Resolute and Non-Resolute) in the
Altruistic treatment (robust rank order test Ù13,7 = 0.57, p = 0.2843).
Non-Resolute Subjects Selfish (S) Altruistic (A) Control (C)
Number of Non-Resolute Subjects 11 13 6
Total Giving: Mean (st.dev.) $0.88 (1.41) $2.83 (2.63) $2.40 (1.96)
Round 1 Giving: Mean (st.dev.) $2.77 (1.69) $3.46 (2.60) $2.00 (2.10)
Rounds 2-10 Giving: Mean (st.dev.) $0.67 (1.21) $2.76 (2.64) $2.44 (1.96)
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for giving by Non-Resolute subjects in the three treatments.
As one can see from Table 3,the rank of average giving among Non-Resolute subjects
across treatments is again consistent with our competitive hypothesis. In contrast to Finding
1, Non-Resolute subjects give significantly less only in the Selfish treatment relative to
the other two treatments (Ù4,4 = ∞, p = 0.01 for both pairwise comparisons), while their
giving in the Altruistic treatment is only insignificantly greater than that in the Control
(Ù4,4 = 1.206).
The dynamics of Non-Resolute subjects’ giving follows the pattern found for all subjects
as discussed in the previous subsection, with, again, the highest initial (round 1) giving
observed in the Altruistic treatment, followed by the Selfish treatment and with the lowest
initial giving in the Control treatment. Initial giving by Non-Resolute subjects in the Selfish
treatment is insignificantly diﬀerent from that in the Altruistic and Control treatments
(Ù4,4 = 0.8341 and Ù4,4 = 0.6458, respectively), with initial giving in the Altruistic treatment
being marginally higher than in the Control treatment (Ù4,4 = 1.586, p = 0.10). Furthermore,
as Cason and Mui (1998) also found, subjects who kept everything in the initial round were
less likely to change their decision at least once (i.e., among subjects giving zero in the first
round, 4 out of 5 were “Resolute” in the Altruistic treatment, 11 out of 13 were Resolute in
the Control treatment and all 8 were Resolute in the Selfish treatment).
In the subsequent rounds 2-10, Non-Resolute subjects give significantly less on average
in the Selfish treatment than in the Altruistic and Control treatments, respectively (Ù4,4 =
15
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∞, p = 0.01 for both pairwise comparisons), while Non-Resolute subjects give only insignif-
icantly more in the Altruistic treatment than in the Control treatment (Ù4,4 = 0.7762). In
other words, while we observe a significant and dramatic decline in giving by Non-Resolute
subjects in the Selfish treatment (Ù4,4 =∞, p = 0.01), by contrast, the initial gap in giving
between Altruistic and Control treatment erodes over time from being marginally signifi-
cant to becoming insignificant, with those in the Control treatment insignificantly increasing
their giving in rounds 2-10 relative to round 1 (Ù4,4 = 0.3723), and those in the Altruistic
insignificantly decreasing their giving (Ù4,4 = 1.2060).
Furthermore, as one can observe from comparing the standard deviations of giving in
Round 1 versus Rounds 2-10 in Table 3, as well as from Figure 4, the Non-Resolute subjects’
giving in the Selfish treatment became more homogenous over time, catching up with more
self-regarding Resolute subjects. Averaging over all ten rounds, the Non-Resolute subjects
in the Selfish treatment give significantly less than their counterparts in the Altruistic and
Control treatments (robust rank order test Ù11,13 = 4.30, p = 0.00003 and Ù11,6 = 3.66,
p = 0.00016, respectively). In contrast, Non-Resolute subjects in the Altruistic treatment,
on average, gave similar amounts to their counterparts in the Control treatment (Ù13,6 = 0.19,
p = 0.4247) (see also Figure 4).
< Figure 4 appears about here >
Finding 5 Those subjects who adjust their allocations at least once (who are “Non-Resolute”)
start out by giving away marginally greater amounts in the Altruistic treatment than in the
Control treatment, with initial giving by such Non-Resolute subjects in the Selfish treatment
lying in-between and being insignificantly diﬀerent from that in the other two treatments.
These Non-Resolute subjects tend to adjust their giving downwards, but only in the treat-
ments with socially relevant information.
To summarize, a majority of subjects in the content-free Control treatment see no incen-
tive to give, “resolving” to keep the entire endowment for the duration of the experiment.
The remaining subjects either resolve to give the same amount in every round of the game
or vary their giving somewhere between giving zero and $5. In the Altruistic treatment,
which provides some social incentives to give, a few subjects resolve to give nothing, and
similar numbers resolve to split their endowment equally, with the remaining Non-Resolute
subjects varying their allocations over time, giving statistically similar overall amounts to
their counterparts in the Control treatment.
The latter finding might arise because Non-Resolute subjects in the Altruistic treatment
have doubts about “which end is up” - namely, whether they are competing to achieve the top
or bottom rank. Indeed, at least two Non-Resolute subjects in the Altruistic treatment do
oscillate between giving zero and giving some amount exceeding $5, sometimes even the entire
16
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$10. Overall, Non-Resolute subjects in the Altruistic treatment learn to give less, catching
up with their more self-regarding counterparts in the Control treatment. This learning to
give less phenomenon is conspicuously absent in the Control treatment, suggesting that the
social information present in the Altruistic treatment may be crucial for subjects’ adjustment
behavior.
By contrast, the social content of the Selfish treatment strongly discourages giving. How-
ever, just as in the Altruistic treatment, there may also have been some uncertainty about
“which end is up” in the Selfish treatment. For instance, we observe fewer “Resolute, zero-
contribution” subjects in the Selfish treatment than in the Control treatment (see Table 2).
Furthermore, some Non-Resolute subjects in two Selfish treatment sessions behaved as if
they were competing for bottom rank in the last rounds of the session. Nevertheless, these
anomalies appear small when compared with the dramatic decline over time in average giving
engendered by the Selfish competitive frame.
We summarize the above results as follows.
Finding 6 Overall, the content-free Control treatment provides a strong and constant dis-
couraging eﬀect on giving. The social incentives imbedded in the Selfish treatment also have
strong discouraging eﬀect that starts out small and grows over time, discouraging giving more
intensely than in the Control treatment. By contrast, the social incentives of the Altruistic
treatment have a comparative encouraging eﬀect on giving, but this eﬀect erodes a little over
time.
5 Exploring Subjects’ Motives and Behavior
In this section we further explore heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations in an eﬀort to better
understand subjects’ behavior in our experiment. To our knowledge, no existing personality
scale addresses the subject of our study, namely, the eﬀect of institutions mobilizing innate
competitive urges on giving behavior.16 We therefore designed our own questionnaire to
elicit information on subjects’ behavioral characteristics, and administered it to subjects at
the end of each experimental session.
16For example, while the low “agreeableness” as measured by the Big Five Personality questionnaire is
often interpreted as competitiveness, it seems to be related more to a lack of compassion toward or interest
in others rather than to a desire to compete with others. While the two are, perhaps, correlated, they
nevertheless seem to represent two diﬀerent personality traits.
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5.1 Assessing the Internal Consistency of Questions
The questionnaire consisted of 24 items (questions) — four questions for each of six diﬀerent
possible “motives” which we label as “Altruism”, “Rivalry”, “Money-Seeking”, “Experi-
menter Demand”, “Conformism”, and “Variety-Seeking”. The 24 questions, the motive each
addresses and the mean and standard deviation of subjects’ responses to those questions (on
a scale of 1-6) are all provided in the Table of Appendix C. In addition, the Table reports
the correlation between the numeric answers to each question and giving amounts in round
1 or rounds 2-10 of the Selfish (S), Control (C) or Altruistic (A) treatments.
Following standard practice in personality research, for each motive we provided four
questions, using two “positively” keyed questions balanced by two “negatively” keyed ques-
tions, indicated by “+” and “-” signs in the motive column of the Table in Appendix C.
This was done so as to balance biases in a subjects’ tendency to agree or to disagree, as well
as to eliminate the idiosyncratic eﬀects of any particular question.
Our first step in analyzing the questionnaire data was to assess the internal-consistency or
reliability of our question groups (motives), that is whether each set of four questions reliably
measured the motive they were intended to capture. A standard reliability test statistic
is Cronbach’s α coeﬃcient, which ranges from 0 to 1.0 and measures the intercorrelation
between every item in a given set; higher values of Cronbach’s α indicate greater reliability.17
Of the six motives (4 question sets), only the Altruism and Rivalry questions had Cron-
bach’s α coeﬃcients that satisfied the recommended 0.75 cut-oﬀ value (0.8349 for Altruism
and 0.8759 for Rivalry); the remaining four motives (question sets) all had α coeﬃcients
below 0.75 (Money-Seeking - 0.6129, Experimenter Demand - 0.6645, Conformism - 0.4456,
Variety-Seeking - 0.5804).18 In other words, while the questions designed to address Altruism
and Rivalry motives appear to have been well-designed, the rest of the questions addressing
Experimenter Demand, Conformism, Money-Seeking or Variety-Seeking motives failed to
reliably capture the motives they were designed to address among the participants in this
study.
Nevertheless, we wish to note that the correlation between giving amounts and an Exper-
imenter Demand motive appears weak; the correlations between giving amounts and answers
to the ‘Demand’ set of questions are significantly diﬀerent from zero only for first round of
the Control treatment. For the Altruistic an Selfish treatments, there is no significant cor-
relation between responses any ‘Demand’ question and giving amounts in round 1 or over
rounds 2-10 (see the correlations in the table of Appendix C).
17See, e.g., Allen and Yen (1979).
18While Cronbach’s α of 0.75 is an acceptable value for large-scale studies, Lounsbury et al. (2006, p. 136)
recommend a higher value of 0.8 for Cronbach’s α for newly developed personality scales such as ours. The
α’s for the Altruism and Rivalry motives meet this higher criterion as well.
18
Page 20 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
5.2 Deducing Common Motivational Factors
Our subsequent analysis will involve only the eight items (questions), that were suﬃciently
well-designed to reliably capture the Altruism and Rivalry motives. Answers to these ques-
tions are not only highly correlated with giving behavior in our experiment — see again the
correlations in the table of Appendix C — but the responses to these eight questions are also
highly correlated with one another; indeed, we find that the two motives, Altruism and Ri-
valry, exhibit a complex pattern of interdependencies preventing their use as two orthogonal
motives. To capture these interdependencies among subjects’ motives, while at the same
time characterizing heterogeneity among subjects’ questionnaire responses with the mini-
mum number of common motivational factors, we conducted a factor analysis of subjects’
responses to these eight questions.19 The eight questionnaire items exhibit acceptable fac-
torability, having a Cronbach’s α of 0.8521 and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of
sampling adequacy of 0.7924. The latter statistic measures (on a 0 to 1.0 scale) the likelihood
that common factors account for the observed correlations among a set of items; a KMO
value of 0.79 is viewed as “middling”, bordering on “meritorious”.20 These findings justified
our further use of factor analysis of these eight items to identify any possible latent common
factors underlying the Altruism and Rivalry motives.21
Application of factor analysis to the eight question items resulted in only two factors with
eigenvalues greater than unity - a standard cutoﬀ criterion, since a factor with an eigenvalue
less than unity accounts for less variation in subjects’ responses than does a single question
item. The factor loadings of these two factors, which represent the correlation between a
variable (question item) and the common factor (and so range from -1.0 to 1.0), along with
the uniqueness values, representing the proportion of a variable’s idiosyncratic variance, i.e.,
total variance not explained by common factors, for all eight items are presented in Table
4.22 As all variables have factor loadings of at least 0.4 on at least one of the two factors,
and all uniqueness values lie below 0.7, all variables were retained for the factor analysis.
Based on the signs of the factor loadings shown in Table 4, the first common factor,
Factor F1 (eigenvalue 3.5905, accounting for 75.79% of variability) can be interpreted as
19Factor analysis is a popular statistical method which allows one to reduce the dimensionality of the
problem and describe variability of subjects’ responses in terms of a small number of common factors. For
an introduction to factor analysis see, e.g., Gorsuch (1983).
20See, e.g. DiLalla and Dollinger (2006, p.250).
21We also performed a factor analysis on a larger set of 12 questions including the eight Altruism and
Rivalry questions and the four “Experimenter Demand” questions. Recall the four Experimenter Demand
questions had the highest Cronbach’s alpha, 0.6645, that was below the 0.75 cut-oﬀ. In this case, our
factor analysis yielded 3 latent factors, leaving us with insuﬃcient degrees of freedom to evaluate the overall
statistical significance. Furthermore, despite one of the three new factors might potentially be interpreted
as being influenced by experimenter demand, the treatment point estimates do not conform with such
interpretation. The details are available from the authors upon request.
22To ease the interpretation, we used the negatives of the original factors in our analysis, and thus report
the reversed signs of the factor loadings. We used Stata to estimate the factors and factor loadings.
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a tendency for being rivalrous and non-altruistic. The second common factor, Factor F2
(eigenvalue 1.3776, accounting for 29.08% of variability) can be interpreted as a tendency for
being rivalrous and altruistic. We thus hypothesize that subjects with large values of Factor
F1 would tend to give less and compete in keeping, while those with large values of Factor
F2 would tend to give more and compete in giving.
Factor F1 Factor F2
Question Loadings Loadings Uniqueness
1 Feel indiﬀerence to others’ misfortunes. 0.6667 -0.4955 0.3099
2 Try not to do favors for others. 0.3832 -0.4740 0.6285
3 Feel sympathy for those who are less fortunate than me. -0.6709 0.4337 0.3617
4 Love to help others. -0.7212 0.3112 0.3830
5 Avoid competitive situations. -0.5589 -0.4931 0.4444
6 Feel that winning or losing doesn’t matter to me. -0.7499 -0.3960 0.2808
7 Drawn to compete with others. 0.7195 0.4378 0.2906
8 Feel that I must win at everything. 0.7977 0.1753 0.3329
Table 4: The results of principal factor analysis of eight items representing Altruism and
Rivalry motives. The uniqueness value is equal to one minus communality, a measure of the
percentage of a variable’s variance that can be jointly explained by all factors. (Variables
with high communality are less unique).
5.3 Using the Motivational Factors to Analyze Giving Behavior:
Preliminaries
In this section, we address the suitability of the two latent factors we have identified for
our subsequent regression analysis. By construction, these factors are independent across all
subjects and treatments and they are also orthogonal within each treatment and thus they
are suitable for our regression analysis.
Furthermore, only Factor F1, representing a hypothetical tendency for competition in
keeping, is found to be highly and positively correlated with being male (r = 0.4202, p =
0.0008). However, we also found that gender is a poor proxy for subjects’ competitive
motives; for example, replacing Factor F1 with a male dummy variable in the regressions we
report on below typically results in a worse overall regression fit as reflected in a lower R2.
Specifically, the coeﬃcient estimates on the gender variable are always less significant than
on the Factor F1 variable.
Finally, as our primary interest lies in the interplay between subjects’ motives and their
behavior in the presence of the competitive institutions provided by our diﬀerent experi-
mental treatments, we need to check whether our results are entirely driven by the subjects’
allocation across treatments. Using two-sided t-tests, we found no significant diﬀerences in
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the value of Factor F1 (the tendency to compete and keep) in all three pairwise compar-
isons between the three treatments. Factor F2 (the tendency to compete and give) is not
significantly diﬀerent between the Selfish and Control treatments, or between the Selfish and
Altruistic treatments, but Factor F2 is significantly lower in the Altruistic treatment than
in the Control treatments (t = 2.4491, two-sided p = 0.0198). We note that the significantly
lower value of Factor F2 (tendency to compete and give) for subjects in Altruistic treatment
relative to the Control treatment may have worked against the influence of the competitive
frame in the Altruistic treatment.
5.4 The Interplay Between Motivational Factors and Behavior
We can now explore the relationship between subjects’ giving behavior and the two motiva-
tional factors we have identified. Here we hypothesize that the two factors have asymmetric
eﬀects in the two treatments with meaningful social information relative to the baseline
assumption of constant giving of zero, and we are agnostic about the eﬀects of the two
motivational factors in the Control treatment. Our econometric specification for giving by
subject i in round j in a treatment k is as follows:
G(j)i =
X
k=A,S,C
αkDummyk +
X
k=A,S,C
βkDummykF1i +
X
k=A,S,C
γkDummykF2i + i.
We begin with an attempt to explain subjects’ initial giving in the first round, before any
rank information was available, by regressing subjects’ initial giving on the two motivational
factors. As one can see from Table 5 (left column), initial giving is significantly diﬀerent from
zero in all three treatments as revealed by the coeﬃcient estimates on the three treatment
dummy terms (DummyA = Altruistic treatment, DummyS = Selfish treatment, DummyC =
Control treatment). Moreover, the coeﬃcient estimates on the treatment dummy terms in the
two treatments with meaningful social information is significantly diﬀerent from that in the
Control treatment (p-values are 0.0033 and 0.0150 for the Altruistic and Selfish treatments,
respectively) and, moreover, the treatment dummy coeﬃcients in the Altruistic treatment
and Selfish treatments are significantly diﬀerent (p-value=0.0349). Furthermore, in these
regressions (as well as those that follow), all signs on the two motivational factors (in in-
teractions with the treatment dummy variables) are consistent with our hypotheses - that
is, Factor F1 (the tendency to compete and keep) contributes negatively to initial giving,
while Factor F2 (the tendency to compete and give) contributes positively to initial giving.
Furthermore, Factor F1 significantly decreases initial giving in both the Selfish and Control
treatment, while the eﬀect of Factor F2 is insignificant.
For average giving over rounds 2-10 (see Table 5, right column), the eﬀect of Factor F1
is again significantly negative in the Selfish and Control treatments, yet Factor F2 now has
a significant positive eﬀect on giving in the Selfish treatment. One possible interpretation
for the latter finding is that subjects with strong tendencies to give and compete in giving
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Variable Giving in Round 1 Average Giving in Rounds 2-10
DummyA 3.2617 (0.5289)∗∗∗ 2.7366 (0.2495)∗∗∗
DummyS 1.9366 (0.1537)∗∗∗ 0.7958 (0.1705)∗∗∗
DummyC 1.0450 (0.2690)∗∗∗ 1.0640 (0.3044)∗∗∗
FactorF1*DummyA -0.0147 (0.7633) -0.2863 (0.6083)
FactorF1*DummyS -0.6736 (0.2457)∗∗ -0.8450 (0.3425)∗∗
FactorF1*DummyC -0.6992 (0.3474)∗ -0.7108 (0.2863)∗∗
FactorF2*DummyA 0.6817 (0.6371) 0.5833 (0.5400)
FactorF2*DummyS 0.1119 (1.0802) 0.5347 (0.1812)∗∗
FactorF2*DummyC 0.3209 (0.3370) 0.6780 (0.5848)
Test Statistics F( 9, 11) = 116.72 F( 9, 11) = 30.88
Significance 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.5392 0.5938
Table 5: The results of regressions with robust standard errors for giving in round 1 and
average giving in rounds 2-10, clustered on groups of 5 subjects, for all 60 subjects. The
baseline assumption is that giving in all periods equals zero and that motivational factors
have no consequences for behavior. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * - p = 0.10,
** - p = 0.05, *** - p = 0.01.
will tend to resist the Selfish frame, though this tendency seems to be captured only by
the average levels of giving in rounds 2-10. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient estimates on the
treatment dummy terms are significantly diﬀerent from zero. While the Altruistic treatment
dummy coeﬃcient is significantly diﬀerent from the dummy coeﬃcients for the other two
treatments (both p-values are less than 0.005), the Selfish and Control treatment dummy
coeﬃcients are not significantly diﬀerent from one another (p-value = 0.4582).
We further looked at whether motivational factors explain the behavior of the “resolute”
subjects (i.e., those who gave the same amount in all ten rounds). Across the three treat-
ments, there were 23 subjects who gave zero in all 10 rounds, and 7 subjects who gave
a constant non-zero amount (see Table 2). We chose to conduct a probit regression on a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a subject gave zero in all 10 rounds, i.e., if a subject resolutely
gave zero in every round. Again, in accordance with our hypothesis of asymmetric eﬀects
of the two factors in the two treatment with meaningful social information, our econometric
specification is:
Pr(Give Nothing)i =
X
k=A,S,C
αkDummyk+
X
k=A,S,C
βkDummykF1i+
X
k=A,S,C
γkDummykF2i+i.
As Table 6 reveals, subjects are significantly less likely to give zero in all 10 rounds in
treatments with meaningful social information, as indicated by the significantly negative
coeﬃcients on the Altruistic and Selfish treatment dummy variables, and more likely to give
zero in the Control treatment, as indicated by the significantly positive coeﬃcient on the
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Control treatment dummy variable, with all dummy coeﬃcients being significantly diﬀerent
from each other (all p-values are less than 0.02). Furthermore, Factor F1, representing
a tendency to give less and compete in keeping, significantly increases the chance that a
subject resolutely gives 0 in both the Selfish and Control treatments. By contrast, Factor
F2, representing a tendency to give more and compete in giving, significantly decreases the
chance that a subject resolutely gives 0 only in Altruistic treatment.23
Variable Zero Resolute Giving
DummyA -1.1364 (0.2264)∗∗∗
DummyS -0.4156 (0.2024)∗∗
DummyC 0.2503 (0.0355)∗∗∗
FactorF1*DummyA 0.0494 (0.4259)
FactorF1*DummyS 0.5377 (0.2727)∗∗
FactorF1*DummyC 0.4110 (0.2154)∗
FactorF2*DummyA -0.4956 (0.2190)∗∗
FactorF2*DummyS -0.0886 (0.2878)
FactorF2*DummyC -0.1711 (0.4045)
Test Statistics Wald chi2(9) = 2660.48
Significance 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood -33.8419
Table 6: The results of probit regression with robust standard errors on a dummy variable
indicating that a subject gave zero in all 10 rounds, clustered on groups of 5 subjects, for
all 60 subjects. The baseline assumption is that the probability a Resolute type gives 0 in
all rounds is 1 and that motivational factors have no consequences for behavior. All dummy
variables are significantly diﬀerent from one. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * -
p = 0.10, ** - p = 0.05, *** - p = 0.01.
We are further interested in the interplay between subjects’ motives and their response
to the rank information in the Selfish and Altruistic treatments. In particular, we look at
how previous-period rank aﬀects subjects’ giving in rounds 2 through 10 in the Selfish and
Altruistic treatments only. Since subjects in our experiment had only ordinal information
about other subjects’ giving, the evolution of the absolute values of giving is less informative
than subjects’ ordinal responses to their rank information. A change in a subject’s giving
has a discontinuous eﬀect on her rank - that is, a 1-cent change in giving may have the same
eﬀect on a subject’s rank as a $10 change in giving, as rank depends not only on one’s own
behavior, but also on the behavior of other subjects in the group. It is thus more meaningful
to look at the directional changes in giving in response to the rank information - that is,
whether a given subject increased her giving, decreased it, or made no change when she was
23As there were just seven resolute subjects who gave non-zero amounts, a similar attempt to identify the
motives for giving constant, non-zero amounts resulted in over-identification.
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ranked top, bottom, or somewhere “in the middle”.24 Furthermore, since rank in giving is the
reverse of rank in keeping, a given subject in a given period may have chosen to participate
in a “race to the bottom” as well as in a “race to the top”.
We thus are interested in quantifying subjects’ tendencies to increase or decrease their
giving in response to prior round rank information. We examined whether a subject ranked
first, middle (i.e., neither first nor last), or last in round t − 1 responded to this rank
information so that their giving in round t, xt, was higher, lower, or the same relative to
her giving, xt−1, in round t − 1. We hypothesized that if a subject competes in giving,
then she should have no incentive to change her next-round giving whenever she is ranked
first in the Altruistic treatment or last in the Selfish treatment, and she should increase her
giving otherwise. Similarly, a subject who competes in keeping, should have no incentive
to change her next-round giving whenever she is ranked first in the Selfish treatment or
last in the Altruistic treatment, and she should decrease her giving otherwise. Table 7
provides a complete characterization of these predicted directional adjustments.25 We have
no predictions for what subjects should do in response to their rank information in the
Control treatment, and thus in the subsequent analysis we concentrate only on subjects’
directional responses to rank information in Altruistic and Selfish treatments.
Altruistic Selfish
Rankt xt > xt−1 xt = xt−1 xt < xt−1 Rankt xt > xt−1 xt = xt−1 xt < xt−1
Top giving giving keeping Top giving keeping keeping
Middle giving not classified keeping Middle giving not classified keeping
Bottom giving keeping keeping Bottom giving giving keeping
Table 7: Classification of subjects’ directional adjustment of giving x according to whether
the subject competes in giving or in keeping - for each of the two competitive treatments.
We constructed an index of directional competition (which we call Direction) by subtract-
ing the number of times a subject behaved as if she competed in giving from the number of
times she competed in keeping out of the nine rounds in which social information was avail-
able. For example, at the extremes, a subject who always gave zero would get a Direction
index value of 9 in either the Altruistic or the Selfish treatment, and vice versa, a subject who
always gave the whole $10, would get a Direction index value of -9 in either the Altruistic
or Selfish treatment. Thus, the values of the Direction index are integers between -9 and
9, with positive values indicating a tendency to make choices consistent with competition
in keeping (and thus a tendency to be near the top of the rank list in the Selfish treatment
24This “crude” classification of ranks was necessitated by a high incidence of ties — particularly at the top
and at the bottom — in the treatments with meaningful social information.
25In addition, we classify a given subject’s behavior as adjustment towards competition in keeping, if in a
particular round of Altruistic treatment all subjects gave nothing (so that everyone was ranked first), and if
this subject kept her giving unchanged. However, we never observed this situation.
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and near the bottom in the Altruistic treatment), while negative index values represent a
tendency to make choices consistent with competition in giving (and thus a tendency to be
near the bottom of the rank list in the Selfish treatment and near the top in the Altruistic
treatment).
Variable Direction
DummyA 0.7068 (0.7185)
DummyS 5.1761 (0.3572)∗∗∗
FactorF1*DummyA 0.5937 (2.2588)
FactorF1*DummyS 2.9603 (1.2831)∗
FactorF2*DummyA -2.6035 (0.9979)∗∗
FactorF2*DummyS -1.7380 (0.9719)
Test Statistics F( 6, 7) = 107.34
Significance 0.0000
R2 0.6051
Table 8: The results of a regression with robust standard errors, clustered on groups of
5 subjects/session, for all 40 subjects in Selfish and Altruistic treatments. The baseline
assumption is that Direction equals nine and that motiv tional factors have no consequences
for behavior. All dummy variables are significantly diﬀerent from nine. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * - p = 0.10, ** - p = 0.05, *** - p = 0.01.
We then regressed the Direction index on the motivational factors in the Selfish and
Altruistic treatments.26 Our regression specification here is:
Directioni =
X
k=A,S
αkDummyk +
X
k=A,S
βkDummykF1i +
X
k=A,S
γkDummykF2i + i
The results are reported in Table 8. There we observe that the Selfish competitive frame
strongly encourages subjects’ adjustments towards competition in keeping as represented
by significantly positive coeﬃcient on the Selfish treatment dummy, which is nevertheless
significantly diﬀerent from nine (p-value=0.0000). In addition, the tendency to compete in
keeping, Factor F1, has a strong positive eﬀect in the Selfish frame, further pushing subjects’
directional adjustment towards making choices consistent with competition in keeping, while
the tendency to compete in giving, Factor F2, is insignificant in the Selfish frame.
By contrast, the coeﬃcient on the Altruistic treatment dummy is insignificantly diﬀerent
from zero, as is the coeﬃcient on Factor F1, the tendency to compete in keeping, in the
Altruistic frame. However, the tendency to compete in giving, Factor F2, has a strong
discouraging eﬀect on subjects’ directional adjustment towards competition in keeping in
26We also conducted an ordered probit analysis, which is more appropriate for our discrete, Direction
index variable, and we obtain results that are qualitatively similar to ordinary least squares regression
results reported in Table 8. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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the Altruistic frame and, instead, encourages subjects’ adjustment toward competition in
giving. In other words, our hypothesis that the competitive environments of our Selfish and
Altruistic treatments work to exploit subjects’ innate competitive urges, finds some support
in our analysis of directional adjustments.
6 Conclusions
We have explored the eﬀect of competitive institutions on giving behavior using a novel
dictator contest design that avoids free-riding behavior, and focuses attention on relative
performance. Specifically we explore whether the design of the competitive institution, as
either a generosity tournament (our Altruistic treatment), an earnings tournament (our
Selfish treatment), or neither (our Control treatment), interacts with intrinsic competitive
motives to aﬀect giving behavior in the absence of any extrinsic rewards (such as social
acclaim or prestige). We find support for our main hypothesis that the competitive frame
does aﬀect giving. However, we also find that the competitive institutions have a non-
uniform eﬀect on subject behavior. As our findings for the Control treatment indicate, in
the absence of any social content, most subjects never change their allocation decisions and
tend to behave in a more self-regarding matter. That is, these Resolute subjects in the
Control treatment give less on average. With social information, subjects are less likely to
be resolute with their giving decisions and many appear responsive to the rank information
in the directions suggested by our competitive hypothesis. Specifically, the Selfish frame,
where subjects compete for top rank in keeping, works to quickly reduce giving amounts.
The Altruistic frame, where subjects compete for top rank in giving, does lead to higher
overall giving amounts relative to the other two treatments, but there is some erosion in
giving behavior in this treatment over time.
Further analysis reveals that there is considerable heterogeneity in individual giving be-
havior, especially in the two treatments with social information. In an eﬀort to better
characterize this heterogeneity, we attempted to uncover subjects’ behavioral motives by
conducting a post-experiment questionnaire. Analysis of this questionnaire data reveals
that subjects’ choices in the experiment are correlated with their responses to questions
addressing their disposition toward altruistic and rivalrous behavior. We also attempted
to uncover other possible motives — specifically, the desire to please others (experimenter
demand eﬀects), conformity, variety-seeking and money-seeking motives. However, subjects’
responses to questions addressing these other motives failed to yield reliably measurable re-
sults and were largely uncorrelated with giving decisions. Thus, while we do not rule out
the possibility that experimenter demand eﬀects or other motives were operative in our ex-
periment, we believe that our findings are driven, at least in part, by innate competitive
motivations.
As a practical matter, our findings suggest that increases in giving brought about by
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competitive mechanisms such as our Altruistic frame may be diﬃcult to sustain over time.
However, we would caution that such a conclusion is based on our design involving a fixed
groups of subjects - an environment that may not be relevant to real-world fundraising
situations. For instance, if the composition of the group competing to be most altruistic
varied over time due to the entry of new philanthropic-competitors and the exit of others, it
might be possible for competitive mechanisms such as our Altruistic frame to sustain high
or even increasing levels of giving over time. We leave exploration of this question to future
research.
Another issue to explore in future research is whether subjects in our experiment were
uncertain about “which end is up”- that is, whether they should have competed for the top
or the bottom rank. While our tournament design “primes”subjects to compete to be at the
top of the rank list - “1st rank”- it seems that such priming does not work uniformly across all
subjects. Indeed, we find that some subjects in the Altruistic treatment demonstrate wide
swings in their giving, suggesting that a designer may wish to better anchor a particular
end of the competitive domain. Indeed, in an earlier version of this paper (available on
request), we found that presenting a token award (a #1 button) to the player ranked first
in the dictator contest reinforced the priming of the competitive institution and worked to
further stimulate giving in the Altruistic treatment.27 We suspect that adding extrinsic
awards of far greater value than our token reward, e.g., social acclaim, prestige, etc. would
serve to further increase competition for the top, number 1 rank. However, the finding that
competition occurs even under the very weak competitive conditions of our experimental
design is significant, as it suggests that innate competitive motives may play a role in giving
decisions.
Two other possibilities we have not explored here are that competitive philanthropic
behavior may involve signaling of 1) wealth (akin to money burning), or 2) social type (i.e.,
generous/altruistic/trustworthy), and thus it would be of interest to pursue a study that
further explored how heterogeneity in endowments or in costs of giving aﬀected subject
behavior in the competitive frames we have considered here. We nevertheless would like to
emphasize that we found substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ giving behavior even when
subjects had identical endowments or costs of giving. Thus, we see our study as a logical
initial step towards understanding competitive philanthropy.
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Figure 1: Distributions of giving for all observations.
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Figure 2: The average amounts given by all subjects in each round of the four sessions of
each of the three treatments. 3
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Figure 3: The average amounts given by all subjects in the four sessions for the diﬀerent
blocks of rounds in each of the three treatments.
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Figure 4: Average giving in rounds 2-10 versus giving in round 1, for each Non-Resolute
subject (represented by a circle). 5
